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The Kazakhstan banking system is increasingly viewed as more advanced than the Russian system. 
Kazakhstan adopted the International Accounting System (IAS) in 2003 and the Basel II norms in 
2005, while Russia has yet to fully adopt either IAS or Basel II. In this paper, bank data for 2002-
2006 are used to estimate models of bank cost efficiency. In contrast to most previous papers, no 
significance difference is found for the average cost efficiency scores of banks for the two countries 
during 2002-2006. How banks are ranked for efficiency depends upon the chosen model (input and 
output sets). An interesting insight is the finding that most banks in both countries are below optim-
al size. 
 
Keywords: Cost efficiency, banks, stochastic frontier approach  






The author is most grateful to Sergei Golovan, Alexander Karminsky, Oleg Eismont, Laurent Weill, 
Iikka Korhonen, Zuzana Fungacova, Subal Kumbhakar, all participants of the BOFIT seminar, the 
participants of the 7
th INFINITI Conference on International Finance in Dublin (June 2009), and the 
participants of the XI European Workshop on Efficiency and Productivity Analysis in Pisa (June 




*NES, CEMI RAS, ICEF HSE Anatoly Peresetsky 
 
Bank cost efficiency in Kazakhstan and Russia 
 
 
  4 
 
Anatoly Peresetsky 







Tässä tutkimuksessa vertaillaan Kazakstanin ja Venäjän pankkijärjestelmän kustannustehokkuutta. 
Kazakstanin pankkijärjestelmää on usein pidetty kehittyneempänä kuin Venäjän järjestelmää. Ka-
zakstan otti käyttöön kansainvälisen tilinpäätösstandardin (International Accounting System, IAS) 
vuonna 2003 ja Basel II -säännöt vuonna 2005, kun taas Venäjä ei ole vielä ottanut täysin käyttöön 
kumpaakaan. Tässä tutkimuksessa käytetään  vuosien 2002–2006 aineistoa pankkien kustannuste-
hokkuuden  mallintamiseksi.  Vastoin  aiempia  tutkimustuloksia  tässä  tutkimuksessa  ei  löydetä 
merkittäviä eroja näiden kahden maan pankkien keskimääräisessä kustannustehokkuudessa vuosina 
2002–2006. Pankkien välinen sijoitus kustannustehokkuusvertailussa riippuu malliin valitusta pa-
nos- ja tuotosjoukosta. Mielenkiintoinen tutkimustulos on, että suurin osa  kummankin maan pan-
keista on optimaalista kokoaan pienempiä.   
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1  Introduction  
 
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the New Independent States inherited pieces of the Soviet bank-
ing system. While the new banking systems had identical initial conditions, their subsequent devel-
opment has depended on country-specific factors such as legislation, state policy, country size, etc. 
Only the banking systems in the three largest former-Soviet states (the Russian Federation, the Re-
public of Ukraine, and the Republic of Kazakhstan) possess enough banks to perform meaningful 
econometric analysis. Further, the data limitations in the case of Ukraine compel us to limit our 
scope of analysis exclusively to the Kazakh and Russian banking systems. Kazakhstan’s banking 
system somewhat defies common expectations as it is institutionally more advanced than the Rus-
sian system. 
Kazakhstan adopted the International Accounting System (IAS) in 2003 and the Basel II 
capital adequacy accord in 2005. In contrast, only a few banks in Russia today even publish IAS-
compliant balance sheets. Moreover, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has caved to pressure from 
Russian banks on several occasions by postponing the transition of banks to IAS. The current date 
for IAS implementation is 2010, but further delays are not out of the question. 
Despite the vast literature on bank efficiency, only a few papers consider the efficiency of 
Russian banks, and, to the best of our knowledge, only a single paper (Fries and Taci, 2005), dis-
cusses the efficiency of banks in Kazakhstan. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on two issues. 
First, we compare the efficiency of Kazakhstan and Russian banks during 2002-2006, a pe-
riod of relatively stable economic development in both countries. In contrast to Fries and Taci 
(2005), who found banks to be more efficient in Kazakhstan than in Russia, we find no significant 
difference in bank efficiency between the two countries. 
Second, we compare bank rankings according to efficiency estimates derived from differ-
ent models (input and output sets) and different specifications of error distribution in the cost func-
tion. Most papers consider just one model specification and make conclusions on bank efficiency 
based on the chosen model, leaving open the issue of how robust those conclusions are to the model 
specification. We use two models and three error specifications for each model, and conclude that 
bank efficiency ratings crucially depend on the model (i.e. the chosen set of outputs and factors) and 
do not significantly depend on error specification. 
Finally, most banks in Kazakhstan and Russia appear to be below their optimal size. Anatoly Peresetsky 
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2  Literature review 
 
Koopmans (1951) introduced the concept of technical efficiency, i.e. a firm is technically efficient 
when it is not possible to generate more output with the same inputs. It is assumed that the inability 
of a firm to produce the maximum possible volume of output can be explained by inefficient man-
agement. 
Farrell (1957) suggests a non-parametric approach to measure technical efficiency by a lin-
ear programming method designated as data envelopment analysis (DEA). Though widely used, 
DEA suffers numerous shortcomings such as sensitivity to random deviations, outliers, and data 
errors. It also requires large datasets. 
Aigner et al. (1977), and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) propose a parametric approach to 
measure technical efficiency: stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). 
Both methods are intensively used in the analysis of the efficiency of banks and financial 
institutions. In the review by Berger and Humphrey (1997), approximately half of 130 studies used 
a parametric approach. Berger and Mester (1997) discuss various SFA models and come to the con-
clusion that the models (in terms of cost efficiency and profit efficiency) give approximately the 
same estimates of technical efficiency of US banks using data for 1990-1995. 
Bauer et al. (1998) compares variants of different approaches (DEA, SFA, as well as the 
distribution free approach, DFA, and the thick frontier approach, TFA) to measure the efficiency of 
US banks over the period 1977-1988. They conclude that, given the same set of four inputs and four 
outputs, parametric and nonparametric methods are not mutually consistent. 
Most papers dealing with the technical efficiency of banks study just one country. Among 
the first papers comparing the technical efficiency of banks in different countries was the study of 
Maudos et al. (2002), who consider the cost efficiency and profit efficiency of banks in ten leading 
EU countries during 1993-1996. The sample included 3,328 observations of 832 banks. The authors 
conclude that the estimated cost efficiency is lower than the estimated profit efficiency and that the 
correlation between the two estimates is low. Mid-sized banks and banks with a high ratio of loans 
to assets are found to be most efficient. Market concentration positively correlates with profit effi-
ciency and negatively with cost efficiency. 
The following papers present an analysis of banks in developing countries. 
Weill (2003) analyzes banks in the Czech Republic and Poland. Foreign-owned banks are 
found to be more efficient than domestic-owned banks.  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Fries and Taci (2005) looks at the technical efficiency of banks in 15 East European transi-
tion countries (including Russia and Kazakhstan) during 1994-2001. Private banks are more effi-
cient than public banks. Kazakh banks are found to be more efficient than Russian banks. 
Bonin et al. (2005a) deal with banks in eleven European transition countries during 1996-
2000. They find that government-owned banks are not appreciably less efficient than domestic pri-
vate banks. Foreign-owned banks are determined to be more cost-efficient and provide better ser-
vice than other banks. 
Bonin et al. (2005b) study the impacts of bank privatization in transition countries. They 
take the largest banks in six relatively advanced countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania) and find that foreign-owned banks are most efficient and govern-
ment-owned banks least efficient. Furthermore, early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-
privatized banks (a result not explained by a selection effect). 
Carvallo and Kasman (2005) estimate a common cost frontier with country-specific envi-
ronmental variables for a panel of 481 banks from 16 Latin American countries. Their results sug-
gest a wide range of inefficiency levels across countries. Underperforming banks tend to be small, 
undercapitalized, and more prone to engage in risky financial policies. 
The authors of two papers (Staikouras et al. 2008; Mamatzaki et al. 2008) use data for six 
countries in southeastern Europe (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Ro-
mania, and Serbia-Montenegro) during 1998-2003, as well as ten new European Union member 
states over the same period. Like Carvallo and Kasman (2005), they find inefficiency varies signifi-
cantly among countries. Foreign banks outperform both state-owned and domestic private-owned 
banks in terms of profit efficiency, while the results are less clear in the case of cost efficiency. 
Lensink et al. (2008) use stochastic frontier analysis for a sample of 2,095 commercial 
banks in 105 countries during 1998-2003. Unlike most studies, they find that foreign ownership 
negatively affects bank efficiency. The authors use, as we do here, the SFA specification suggested 
by  Battese  and  Coelli  (1995).  As  in  most  of  the  papers  mentioned  above,  they  also  use  the 
BankScope
1 database and give the standard caveats about its data imperfections (see e.g. Bonin et 
al., 2005b). Among the more notable BankScope database drawbacks are its inclusion of non-bank 
financial institutions, repeated use of several banks in the data, and failure to compensate for the 
different accounting systems used by banks in different countries – all problems that are particularly 
acute in transition economies. 
                                                 
1 Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing, www.bvdep.com/en/bankscope.html Anatoly Peresetsky 
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A handful of papers tackle the technical efficiency of Russian banks. In addition to Fries 
and Taci (2005), this problem is discussed in the following. 
Caner and Kontorovich (2004), the pioneers in estimating the technical efficiency of Rus-
sian banks, use data for 1999-2003. They conclude that the efficiency of Russian banks is signifi-
cantly lower than the efficiency of European banks. 
Styrin (2005), analyzing data for the period 1999-2002, finds an increase in the average ef-
ficiency of Russian banks. He includes the ratio of past due loans to total loans as a proxy for the 
riskiness of bank financial policies. The focus of the paper is to determine the factors that influence 
efficiency. He finds that different methods produce different results, but a negative correlation be-
tween efficiency and ratio of past due loans to total loans is common to all methods. 
Balash and Pavlyuk (2005) use data for 2000-2003 for 160 Russian banks. Applying a 
profit-efficiency SFA approach, they conclude that Moscow banks are less efficient than regional 
banks and that large banks are most efficient. 
Golovan (2006) determines the factors that are important for the efficiency of Russian 
banks in issuing loans and attracting deposits. He finds that the average bank efficiency increased 
over 2003-2005. The most efficient lenders are Moscow banks and banks with a high capitalization. 
A high ratio of past due loans is negatively related to efficiency. The larger the bank, the greater its 
efficiency. As we might expect, this relation is weaker for large banks, since large banks diversify 
their activities and their efficiency in issuing loans may be lower than that of specialized mid-sized 
banks. 
Golovan et al. (2008) include factor prices and variables related to the quality and riskiness 
of the assets in their model. Analyzing Russian bank data for 2002-2005, they find Moscow banks 
are the most efficient. Moreover, the efficiency of foreign-owned banks does not differ significantly 
from the efficiency of domestic-owned banks. A U-shaped influence of bank size is noted. Initially, 
as size increases, efficiency decreases (as a result of diversification of bank activities). Once a size 
threshold is passed, efficiency begins to rise. The explanation offered is that the largest banks use 
their size to gain an advantage in competing for funds and minimizing costs. 
Karas et al. (2008) use data on Russian banks for the period 2002–2006 to determine 
whether private banks are more efficient than state-owned banks. They conclude there is no direct 
evidence that the privatization of a bank in Russia increases its efficiency. Also they find that for-
eign banks are more efficient than domestic banks. They suggest the efficiency of the Russian bank-
ing system could be boosted by having the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) advance banking regula- 
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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tions, increasing competition among banks, and allowing foreign banks greater access to the Rus-
sian banking sector. 
 
 
3  Kazakhstan and Russia banking systems 
 
The banking systems of Kazakhstan and Russia have much in common. Both started at the same 
time and both are considered to be the most developed of the post-Soviet countries. 
They also differ sharply in some respects. It is generally held that banking regulation in 
Kazakhstan is the most advanced among the post-Soviet countries. According to the rating agency 
Expert RA,
2 Kazakh banks as of 2007 were ahead of Russian banks in terms of technology, practice 
of risk management, quality of banking regulation and appropriateness of size given the size of the 
economy. Indicators of the economy and banking systems of the two countries are presented in Ta-
ble 1. 
 




GDP (US$ billion)  1011  73.7 
GDP per capita (US$)  7082  4644 
Number of banks  1189  33 
Assets (US$ billion)  533.4  67.2 
Equity (US$ billion)  64.29  8.85 
Assets / GDP, %  52.8%  91.1% 
Equity / GDP, %  6.4%  12.0% 
Loans / GDP, %  30.2%  61.5% 
Deposits / GDP, %  31.4%  48.4% 
Fixed assets  (US$ billion)  15.57  0.704 
Equity / Assets, %  12.1%  13.2% 
Loans / Deposits  0.960  1.27 
Average assets (US$ billion)  0.45  2.04 
Assets / Fixed assets  34.3  95.4 
Banks’ assets per capita (US$ billion)  3.74  4.23 
 
                                                 
2 www.raexpert.ru/researches/banks/retail/part1/. 
3 Central Bank of the Russian Federation, www.cbr.ru. 
4 Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on regulation and supervision of financial markets and financial organizations 
(FSA, АФН), www.afn.kz. Anatoly Peresetsky 
 
Bank cost efficiency in Kazakhstan and Russia 
 
 
  10 
As of January 1, 2007, the Russian banking system consisted of 1,189 banks, a significant 
share of which consisted of small banks. The average Russian bank was significantly smaller than 
the average Kazakh bank (see Table 1). 
The structure of the Kazakhstan banking sector is similar to the structure of the banking 
sector in Russia. The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan (the analog to CBR), is respon-
sible for money liquidity and regulates the activity of the commercial banks. As of January 1, 2007, 
the Kazakhstan banking system consisted of 33 second-tier banks. Note that 59% of the total assets 
of the banking system belonged to Kazakhstan’s Big Three: Kazkommertsbank, Bank TuranAlem 
(BTA Bank), and Halyk Savings Bank of Kazakhstan. 
At the end of 2006, the relative size of the Kazakhstan banking system (in terms of total 
assets to GDP or total equity to GDP) was almost twice that of the Russian banking system. The 
relative volume of issued loans was significantly higher (61.5% in Kazakhstan versus 30.2% in 
Russia), while the relative volume of deposits did not differ significantly (48.4% versus 31.4%). 
This points to differences in the structure of fund sources.  
The Kazakhstan banking system continued to boom in 2006. Total assets, equity and fixed 
capital increased by 97%, 100%, and 66%, respectively. This was significantly higher than the indi-
cators for the Russian banking system (44%, 36%, and 9%, respectively). 
 
 
4  Data 
 
For a correct comparative analysis of the two banking systems it is highly desirable – and somewhat 
problematic − to use bank data for the two countries in the same accounting system. Kazakh banks 
have published balance sheets in accordance with IAS since 2003. Many, but not all, Russian banks 
voluntarily published dual versions of their balance sheets; one compiled under the Russian Ac-
counting System (RAS) as required by CBR, and IAS. Databases on RAS balance sheets are avail-
able from e.g. Interfax or Mobile information agencies, but to the best of our knowledge no accessi-
ble database on IAS balance sheets of Russian banks currently exists. In this paper, we use data on 
audited IAS balance sheets of Kazakhstan and Russia banks from Moody’s. The obvious advantage 
is that these data comply with a single set of rules. The disadvantage is that the number of Russian 
banks  is  limited  to  banks  with  a  Moody’s  rating.  This  means  that  we  must  deal  with  a  non-
representative sample biased toward large banks interested in having a rating to gain access to the 
international financial market.  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Our sample thus covers the period 2002–2006, representing 78 Russian banks (382 obser-
vations) and 16 Kazakh banks (78 observations). 
The mean sample values of selected indicators for Russian and Kazakhstan banks at the 
end of 2006 are presented in Table 2. Note that the total assets from the sample contain 77.8% of 




Table 2  Average values of indicators over the samples of Kazakhstan and Russian banks as of January 1, 2007 
Indicator (US$ million)  Russia  Kazakhstan 
Assets   5,324.0  4,310.7 
Equity      612.1     445.2 
Deposits   3,904.6  2,454.6 
Loans   3,411.2  2,756.4 
Borrowings      617.1  1,179.9 
Interest income      419.7     302.0 
Interest expenses     177.8     165.1 
Personnel expenses       98.0       31.1 
Operational expenses      233.7       68.4 
Net profit       120.8       70.1 
Fixed assets      168.6       43.8 
Fixed expenditures      135.7       37.3 
 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2, we see the average size of the Russian bank in the sample is 
larger than the average size of the Kazakh bank in the sample (and vice versa for the banking sys-
tems as a whole). This indicates a significant non-homogeneity of banks and a bias of the sample 
toward large banks. Particularly significant is the difference in personnel expenses and fixed assets 
(much larger for Russian banks). Kazakh banks have more than double the borrowings of Russian 
banks; this is the difference in the sources of funding noted above. 
The average values of some indicators of banks’ efficiency over the sample for the end of 
2006 are presented in Table 3. For each country, the average of ratios and the ratio of averages of 
the indicator is presented (e.g. average value of equity to assets ratios and ratio of average equity to 
average assets).
6 Due to the non-homogeneity of the banks in the samples, these values are differ-
ent. The differences in these values indicate the shapes of the distributions of the indicators over the 
                                                 
5 As calculated by AFN data. This does not correspond to Tables 1 and 2, because Table 2 presents data on consolidated 
balance sheets of Kazakh banks, while Table 1 presents data from the AFN site, which is derived from unconsolidated 
balance sheets. The main differences stem from the reporting of Kazkommertsbank and Bank TuranAlem. Expert RA 
data differ from AFN data for the same reason. 
6 Equal to the ratio of total equity to total assets, as calculated for the sample. Anatoly Peresetsky 
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sample. For example, the ROA profitability of large Russian banks is higher than the ROA of small 
Russian banks. The reverse is true for Kazakhstan. 
The ratio of deposits to assets is higher for Russian banks and the ratio of borrowings to 
assets is lower for Russian banks than for Kazakhstan banks. Other indicators calculated by the 
sample do not differ significantly. 
 
 
Table 3  Average values of relative indicators of banks in the sample at the end of 2006 
2006   Russia  Kazakhstan 








Equity / Assets, %  13.6  11.5  18.7  10.3 
Return on assets, ROA, %  1.7  2.3  2.5  1.6 
Return on equity, ROE, %  14.1  19.7  16.5  15.7 
Costs to assets, %  7.9  7.7  6.2  5.4 
Deposits to assets, %  72.2  73.3  53.6  56.9 
Loans to assets, %  62.4  64.1  63.0  63.9 




5  Cost-efficiency models 
 
We use the following definition of (in)efficiency as formulated by Berger and Mester (1997). 
Cost efficiency shows how close a bank’s expenditures are to the best examples given the same 
output and environment. Assuming a multiplicative form of inefficiency, the cost function can be 
written as 
 
ln ( , , , ) C f w y z q u v .          (1) 
 
Here,  C  represents expenditures (costs);  w  factor prices;  y  output;  z fixed factors (resources, 
output); q environment variables that might influence output, v a random error, and u inefficiency. 
It is assumed that  0 Ev , and that  0 u . 
Currently, the most common choice for the functional form of the cost function (1) is the 
translog specification (2) 
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
0
1 1 1 ,
ln ln (ln ) ln ln
KK
m m m m
it m it m it mn it it it it it
m m m n K
C x x x x d u v .  (2)  
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Here, 
(1) (2) ( ) ( , ,..., )
K x x x  is vector ( , , , ) w y z q  of the arguments of the function f from (1),  it d  repre-
sent external environment variables, i the bank’s number (ID), and t time (year) of the observation. 
We consider the following three specifications of the distribution of the error  it v  and inef-
ficiency component  it u : 
(1) 
2 ~ (0, ) it v vN , 
2 ~ (0, ) it u uN  (normal and half-normal distributions); 
(2) 
2 ~ (0, ) it v vN ,  and  the  inefficiency  component  has  a  truncated  normal  distribution 
2 ~ ( , ) it it u u N m , where 
() l
it l it l mg  and 
(1) ( ) ( ,..., )
L g g g  is a vector of factors that have an 




, ~ (0, ) it v it vN , 
2
, ~ (0, ) it u it uN , where 
2 ( ) 2 ( )
,, ln , ln
vu
v it it u it it az az  is a linear function of 
bank and external variables. 
In all specifications it is assumed that all  it u  and  js v  are uncorrelated. Consider two mod-
els, i.e. different specifications of the cost functions (1) and (2): 
The first model includes a single output (loans) and the prices of three factors: labor, fixed 
capital, and funds. We use the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets as a proxy for the price of 
labor. This is a common choice in the absence of data on the quantity of personnel (see e.g. Car-
vallo and Kasman, 2005). We use the ratio of differences between operational expenses and person-
nel expenses to fixed assets as a proxy for the price of fixed capital. The price of funds is calculated 
by dividing total interest expenses by total deposits 
The second model includes three outputs (loans, deposits, borrowings) and the prices of 
two factors (labor, fixed capital). For both models the full translog specification (2) is used. 
The first model compares banks with the same volume of loans and same prices, so that 
banks may optimize their costs by varying the volumes of their deposits and borrowings. The sec-
ond model compares banks with equal volumes of loans, deposits, and borrowings. Thus, the sec-
ond model leaves less room to optimize expenditures. It is likely that the average efficiency esti-
mates given by the first model will be lower than under the second model as many banks cannot 
vary deposits and borrowing volumes due to institutional restrictions. 
For both models, we use the three specifications of the error distributions and the ineffi-
ciency component mentioned above. STATA was used for the estimating. Usually, the estimate of 
                                                 
7 This specification was originally suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995). Anatoly Peresetsky 
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the value  exp ( | ) ce E u u v  was used as a measure of bank efficiency in specification (1), 
which has values from the interval [0, 1]; the closer ce is to 1, the more efficient the bank. An exact 
formula for the calculation of efficiency can be found, e.g. in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
In the specification of the error terms in (2), vector g contains four components: the inter-
cept, the dummy variable for Kazakhstan, a proxy for capital sufficiency (the ratio of equity to as-
sets) and its square for the first model, and equity and assets for the second model. In the specifica-
tion of the error terms in (3), the vector 
() u z  consists of two components: the intercept and the 
dummy variable for Kazakhstan, and vector 
() v z  consists of three components: the intercept, the log 
of equity, and the square of the log of equity. 
Full control for the external country and time-specific factors was used in all specifica-
tions: vector  it d  contains ten components, i.e. ten year-country dummies for the two countries and 
the five years of observations (2002-2006). 
In all six models (both model types and three specifications of the error term for each 
type), inefficiency is found to be statistically significant. 
Time invariant efficiency. The six models described above assume the possibility that in-
efficiency varies with time. De Young (1997) argues that for a four-to-six-year period it is reason-
able to suppose that the inefficiency is time invariant. We also consider estimates for time-invariant 
efficiency, which we estimate in several ways. First, we use averaged efficiency estimates derived 
from the six models given above. Second, we estimate a random effect panel data model (3). which 
is similar to the model (2) except that the inefficiency u is time invariant: 
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
0
1 1 1 ,
ln ln (ln ) ln ln
KK
m m m m
it m it m it mn it it it i it
m m m n K
C x x x x d u v .  (3) 
The  distribution  of  i u   is  assumed  to  be  truncated  normal, 
2 ( , ) u Nm .  The  formula 
exp ( | ) ce E u u v  is used to estimate the efficiency given the estimate  ˆ of  uv . 
Third, we use a distribution free approach, DFA. We estimate the random effect panel data model 








 as estimator for  i u . Cost efficiency is calculated by  
() exp( ( min( ))
df
i i i ce u u           (4) 
In this approach at least one bank achieves an efficiency score of 1. 
We include time dummies and their cross terms with the country dummy in the cost func-
tions in both (2) and (4). This implies that we suppose that the cost function in the two countries 
could differ by a factor that varies with time and country. In this way we achieve full control for  
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differences in the macroeconomic environments in the two countries. This is necessary, since, as 
pointed out by Berger (2007), banks that operate in different nations often face highly disparate 
prudential supervisory and regulatory conditions, labor laws, market conditions (such as competi-
tion for inputs or outputs), and levels of financial market evolution. All these factors may affect a 
bank’s cost performance, resulting in the possibility that it is measured as being a certain distance 
from the common frontier for reasons totally unrelated to its competence in minimizing costs. A 
comprehensive  discussion  of  the  common  production  frontier  problem  can  be  found  in  Berger 
(2007).
8 
All other coefficients  ,, m m mn  are assumed to be constant over time and the same for 
both countries. This assumption seems not overly restrictive: the two countries have strong eco-
nomic ties; the largest Russian banks (e.g. Sberbank, VTB) have branches in Kazakhstan, and the 
largest Kazakhstan bank, BTA, has branches in Moscow. 
 
 
6  Results 
 
Average values of efficiency estimates over countries and years are presented in Table 5 and Figure 
3 in the Appendix. These were calculated in accordance with the first model for three specifications 
of the error term (ce1, ce2, ce3), and in accordance with the second model (ce4, ce5, ce6). 
The estimate ce2 is quite different from the other estimates. This could be a technical diffi-
culty of estimation: finding the extreme of a function of several variables is an algorithmically 
complex problem. Moreover, it is difficult to find the same set of factors 
(1) ( ) ( ,..., )
L g g g  for the 
second specification of errors for both models due to problems with the convergence of the algo-
rithm. Thus, we use the equity to assets ratio, its square, and the Kazakhstan dummy variable as the 
set of 
(1) ( ) ( ,..., )
L g g g  factors in the second specification for the first model (ce2 estimate), and 
logs of equity and assets, and the Kazakhstan dummy variable in the second specification for the 
second model (ce5 estimate).  
Tests show that mean bank efficiency in all models does not differ statistically for the two 
countries. This result differs from the conclusion of Fries and Taci (2005), who find Kazakh banks 
more efficient than Russian banks based on data for the period 1994-2001.  
                                                 
8 Also see Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Weill (2003). Anatoly Peresetsky 
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This difference in conclusions can be explained in several ways:  
1)  Different periods of observations (1994-2001 and 2002-2006).  
2)  The 1994-2001 period includes the financial crisis of 1998, which is an outlier in the da-
ta and in a regression results are often driven by an outlier.  
3)  Different models are used. Fries and Taci (2005) use a model with two outputs (deposits 
and loans) and one price (the ratio of operation expenditures to total assets). This model 
does not take into account borrowings of Kazakh banks, which were especially high the 
last few years, and so this model may not be adequate to estimate the situation for the 
period 2002-2006. 
4)  Potentially, as Fries and Taci (2005) report, the effect of a higher efficiency of Kazakh 
banks disappears if country-level variables are included in the regression. Remember 
that the inclusion of country-level variables in the regression allow us to take into ac-
count possible differences in the cost function for the two countries due to differing bank 
environments (taxes, interest rates, legislation). In our model specifications (2) and (3) 
we have full control of country-specific external factors, including time dummies and 
cross terms of time dummies with the Kazakhstan dummy. 
 
The first explanation is supported by Styrin (2005) and Golovan (2006), who find an in-
creasing efficiency of Russian banks during the periods 1999-2002 and 2003-2005.  
Regardless of the surprisingly low ce2 estimates for Kazakh banks, the rankings of the 
bank-year observations by estimated efficiency for different specifications of the first and the sec-
ond model are quite close to each other, especially in a one-country framework. Spearman rank-
order correlations are presented in Table 6 in the Appendix. The correlation for one model type and 
one country are all above 0.82 (0.91, if the ce2 estimate is dropped).  
However, rankings by the two model types differ significantly. This is hardly surprising as 
the models themselves differ significantly. The first model considers cost efficiency by comparing 
banks with the same volume of loans and factor prices (including deposit prices). The second model 
considers cost efficiency by comparing banks with the same volume of loans, deposits, and borrow-
ings. 
This difference in models also explains the differences in changes in the average efficiency 
over time (see Table 5 and Figure 3 in the Appendix). For example, if we consider the first specifi-
cation for both models, we conclude that the average bank efficiency of Kazakh banks decreases 
with time according to the first model (ce1), but this effect is not observed in the second model  
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(ce4). This difference in the conclusions can be explained by the fact that the second model takes 
into account the difference in the sources of funding in the two countries. 
ROA and ROE. What is the relation of the two standard performance measures, ROA (re-
turn on assets) and ROE (return on equity), to the banks’ cost efficiency? One can hardly expect a 
high correlation between these indicators and cost efficiency, because they estimate bank perform-
ance from different points of view. A bank with a high ROA does not necessarily have a high value 
of cost efficiency as it is possible that another bank with the same volume of outputs (deposits, 
loans, etc.) has lower expenditures. Spearman rank-order correlations of ROA and ROE indicators 
with estimates of cost efficiency are presented in Table 7 in the Appendix for the total sample and 
separately for each country. The correlation between cost efficiency and ROA is positive (the sole 
exception is model 2, which, as noted above, most likely was not estimated correctly), larger than 
the correlation between cost efficiency and ROE (close to zero), but, as expects, very low (0.06 to 
0.18 for Russia and -0.06 to 0.29 for Kazakhstan). These results are consistent with the findings re-
ported by Bauer et al. (1998), who found correlations between ROA and efficiency measures gener-
ated by different techniques in the range 0.00-0.023; see also Weill (2004), who finds correlations 
in the range 0.06-0.30. Figure 1 presents the joint distribution of ROA and ce3 over the whole sam-
ple. 
 











Economies of scale.  The models we use here to estimate cost efficiency could just as well 
be used for estimating economies of scale. For example, if all outputs grow by 1%, but total costs 
grow by less than 1%, then increasing the size of the bank leads to lower costs per unit of output. 
Following Carvallo and Kasman (2005), we calculate the following measure of the scale economies 
for each bank in the sample: Anatoly Peresetsky 
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Here, i y are outputs. If scale < 1, then banks operate below the optimal scale levels and can reduce 
costs by increasing output. Let scale1 to scale6 be the measures of the scale economies calculated 
for each of our six models. Table 4 presents the average values over five years of observation of 
these measures separately for Russian and Kazakh banks. The first and third quartiles of the esti-
mated distributions of efficiency are also presented. Since most efficiency scores are below 1, most 
banks would benefit from getting bigger. This conclusion is supported by Figure 4 in the Appendix, 
which presents histograms of the measures scale3 and scale6 for the sample of Russian banks. 
 
 
Table 4  Average values of the measures of the scale economies 
  Russia  Kazakhstan 
Measure  Average  1
st Quartile  3
rd Quartile  Average  1
st Quartile  3
rd Quartile 
scale1  0.929  0.894  0.973  0.961  0.903  1.007 
scale2  0.905  0.860  0.954  0.914  0.849  0.982 
scale3  0.933  0.895  0.977  0.966  0.904  1.010 
scale4  0.923  0.886  0.960  0.963  0.920  0.991 
scale5  0.946  0.923  0.970  0.969  0.943  0.983 
scale6  0.901  0.857  0.939  0.989  0.903  1.011 
 
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the average values of the estimated measure of scale 
economies scale1 for the samples of banks from the two countries. For both countries this measure 
increases over time. Therefore, in both countries the banking systems were moving in the direction 
of minimizing relative costs. The measures scale2-scale6 lead to the same conclusion, so the choice 
of model is not important here. 
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Figure 5 in the Appendix presents scatter plots of the scale economies measure versus size 
of the bank. The possible effect of the scale economies decreases with the size of the bank. The out-
lier in the plot for scale3 corresponds to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan, which was estab-
lished in 2001 by decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and is not entirely a 
commercial bank. The main purpose of the bank is to increase the efficiency of government invest-
ments, develop industrial infrastructure, and assist in attracting domestic and foreign investment 
into the national economy. 
Time-invariant efficiency. Let ce1m–ce6m be the cost efficiency scores ce1–ce6 averaged 
over time. Panel data cost frontier models with time invariant inefficiency produce efficiency scores 
ce01 for model 1 and ce02 for model 2. Estimating panel data random effect linear regressions, we 
use formula (4) to calculate DFA estimates of efficiency, and dfce1 and dfce2 for the first and sec-
ond model, respectively. We have five estimates of time invariant efficiency for model 1 (dfce1, 
ce01, ce1m, ce2m, ce3m) and five estimates for model 2 (dfce2, ce02, ce4m, ce5m, ce6m). Spear-
man rank-order correlations of these ten efficiency estimates are presented in Table 8 in the Appen-
dix. From the table, it is apparent that the ranking of efficiency estimates for the first and second 
models are quite similar: Spearman correlations are in excess of 0.77 for model 1 and in excess of 
0.81 for model 2. If we exclude the (possibly not correctly estimated) averages ce2m and ce5m, the 
correlations exceed 0.80 and 0.87, respectively. A distribution-free approach gives results similar to 
these estimates, based on different error distribution assumptions. 
Spearman correlations for efficiency estimates for the different models are much lower: 
0.18-0.60 (0.38-0.60, excluding ce2m and ce5m).  
At least in this case, we must conclude that the efficiency ranking depends crucially on the 
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7  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we considered the robustness of various specifications of cost-efficiency models using 
data for Kazakh and Russian banks over the period 2002-2006. 
We find that the ranking of the banks according to the estimated cost efficiency largely de-
pends upon the model specification (the chosen set of outputs and factors). The specification of the 
distribution of the error term has a much smaller impact on the ranking. 
As expected, the model with three outputs (our second model) produces higher values of 
cost efficiency on average than the model with a single output. 
In contrast to Fries and Taci (2005), we do not find a statistically significant difference in 
the cost efficiency of banks in Kazakhstan and Russia. It could be that this difference became insig-
nificant as the two banking systems evolved after 2001. An alternative explanation is that the speci-
fication of the cost function used by Fries and Taci (2005) does not distinguish between deposits 
and borrowings. 
Most banks in both countries are still below their optimal size. However, both banking sys-
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Appendix 
 
Table 5  Average values of bank technical efficiency 
  Russia  Kazakhstan 
Year  ce1  ce2  ce3  ce4  ce5  ce6  ce1  ce2  ce3  ce4  ce5  ce6 
2002  0.751  0.787  0.756  0.817  0.851  0.837  0.760  0.361  0.788  0.801  0.793  0.742 
2003  0.753  0.763  0.759  0.816  0.863  0.837  0.745  0.391  0.771  0.798  0.807  0.737 
2004  0.751  0.755  0.756  0.814  0.859  0.836  0.735  0.432  0.768  0.801  0.798  0.736 
2005  0.752  0.753  0.758  0.817  0.867  0.838  0.725  0.428  0.764  0.807  0.832  0.743 
2006  0.753  0.757  0.758  0.812  0.865  0.834  0.735  0.408  0.771  0.800  0.840  0.727 
 
Table 6  Spearman rank-order correlations of technical efficiency estimates 
All  ce1  ce2  ce3  ce4  ce5  ce6 
ce1  1           
ce2  0.792  1         
ce3  0.988  0.736  1       
ce4  0.576  0.386  0.577  1     
ce5  0.478  0.301  0.460  0.940  1   
ce6  0.574  0.513  0.539  0.941  0.918  1 
Russia  ce1  ce2  ce3  ce4  ce5  ce6 
ce1  1           
ce2  0.913  1         
ce3  0.996  0.913  1       
ce4  0.568  0.471  0.570  1     
ce5  0.462  0.320  0.453  0.947  1   
ce6  0.567  0.476  0.571  0.994  0.937  1 
Kazakhstan  ce1  ce2  ce3  ce4  ce5  ce6 
ce1  1           
ce2  0.827  1         
ce3  0.996  0.818  1       
ce4  0.617  0.499  0.632  1     
ce5  0.503  0.306  0.527  0.920  1   
ce6  0.604  0.488  0.615  0.993  0.926  1 
 
 
Table 7  Spearman rank-order correlations of technical efficiency estimates with ROA and ROE 
All  ce1  ce2  ce3  ce4  ce5  ce6 
ROA  0.117  –0.003  0.130  0.154  0.133  0.087 
ROE  0.018  –0.193  0.038  0.167  0.235  0.073 
Russia             
ROA  0.128  0.063  0.118  0.160  0.183  0.154 
ROE  0.059  –0.061  0.049  0.212  0.320  0.197 
Kazakhstan             
ROA  0.192  0.288  0.197  0.205  0.056  0.178 
ROE  –0.026  –0.061  0.002  0.050  0.052  0.022 
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Figure 3  Average values of bank technical efficiency  
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Table 8  Spearman rank-order correlations of cost efficiency time-invariant estimates 
  dfce1  ce01  ce1m  ce2m  ce3m  dfce2  ce02  ce4m  ce5m  ce6m 
dfce1  1                   
ce01  0.991  1                 
ce1m  0.879  0.822  1               
ce2m  0.841  0.817  0.845  1             
ce3m  0.856  0.800  0.981  0.777  1           
dfce2  0.524  0.485  0.605  0.440  0.602  1         
ce02  0.535  0.497  0.605  0.445  0.602  0.999  1       
ce4m  0.436  0.382  0.600  0.411  0.595  0.945  0.935  1     
ce5m  0.251  0.182  0.487  0.307  0.457  0.823  0.810  0.930  1   
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